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ARTICLES
DEMOCRATIC SCHOOLS AND MORAL EDUCATION
AMY GUTMANN*
Our earliest moral education is not by precept or reason-
ing, but by discipline and example. We are first educated
morally by our parents. They love and nurture us, later also
reward and punish, praise and blame us for our actions. For
most of us, the family continues to play a large role in build-
ing our character for many years. But early in our lives, the
family begins to share the task of character training with
other associations: nursery schools and day-care centers,
schools, churches and synagogues, civic organizations, friend-
ship circles, and work groups. As children move outside and
eventually beyond their original families, their moral charac-
ter is shaped by the examples of those whom they love and
respect as well as by rules regulating the association to which
they belong.
But character training of this sort is only one kind of
moral education, undoubtedly most effective during our
childhood. At some stage in our development, we also be-
come responsive to another kind of moral education, one
that is more intellectual in its effect and rationalist in its
method. We learn to think critically and hence to argue and
to make decisions about moral issues. This process of moral
reasoning is socially desirable because it enables us to under-
stand, to communicate, and in some cases to resolve our
moral disagreement. Without this understanding, we cannot
expect widespread toleration of dissent. Nor can we expect
minorities ever to convince majorities, or to be convinced by
them, of their moral point of view. But quite apart from its
political function, we need the capacity for independent
moral deliberation in order to make hard moral choices in
situations where our habits and the authorities we accept do
not supply clear guidance. These two facts about our lives -
that we disagree about what is moral and that we face hard
moral choices as individuals even when we agree as a group
* Associate Professor of Politics, Princeton University, Rockefeller
Resident Fellow, Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of
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- are the basis for an argument that democratic citizens
learn to think about morality as a necessary (though by no
means sufficient) condition for their being moral and sharing
political sovereignty as equals.
People adept at moral reasoning who lack training in
moral character are sophists of the worst sort: they use moral
arguments to serve whatever ends they happen to choose for
themselves. They do not take moral arguments seriously nor
are they able to distinguish between the obvious demands
and the agonizing dilemmas of moral life. But those who pos-
sess sturdy moral character without a developed capacity for
moral reasoning are ruled only by habit and authority, and
are incapable of constituting a society of political equals or of
taking moral responsibility for their own actions. Moral edu-
cation in character and in reasoning both are necessary,
neither sufficient, for creating democratic citizens.
I. A CASE FOR DEMOCRATIC CONTROL
What role should democratic schools play in moral edu-
cation? The simple, commonly offered answer is that demo-
cratic schools should develop in all children values and char-
acter essential to democratic politics. On one formulation,
their goals should be:
knowledge of the political system and how it really and ide-
ally works, development of the skills of participation in civic
life, improvement of civic competence, commitment to val-
ues compatible with the principles which underlie demo-
cratic institutions and a capacity to analyze the conse-
quences of those values, and development of self-esteem so
that all individuals feel that their participation in civic life
can make a difference.'
Although such general formulations - that schools
should prepare children to share the rights and responsibili-
ties of democratic citizenship - are not incorrect, they leave
all the hard problems unresolved. Citizens do not agree upon
what democratic character ideally is or how schools should
develop that character. Nor is there a consensus among phi-
losophers and professional educators. Yet if we assume that
schools should share responsibility for creating democratic
citizens, we must find fair means of resolving the many dis-
1. Education for Responsible Citizenship: The Report of the National Task
Force on Citizenship Education, 9 (1977).
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putes among citizens, philosophers and educators over the
ends and means of moral education within school walls.
Let's begin by disposing of the "if" formulation. Should
schools share this responsibility? A negative answer would
quickly resolve many of the political problems of moral edu-
cation. Schools would leave character development and train-
ing in moral reasoning to families and voluntary associations.
An apparent attraction of this solution is that public schools
would thereby rid themselves of all the political controversies
now surrounding moral education. They could get on with
the task of teaching cognitive skills and factual knowledge.
But the only way to prevent schools from engaging in moral
education is to rid society of schools, an alternative that
should be rejected for many reasons not specific to moral
education."
If schools teach anything, they teach morality and shape
moral character. Even if they avoid all courses that deal ex-
plicitly with morality or civic education, they still engage in
moral education by virtue of their "hidden curriculum,"
noncurricular policies that serve to develop moral attitudes
and character in students.8 Schools develop moral character
at the same time as they try to teach basic cognitive skills, by
insisting that students sit in their seats, raise their hands
before speaking, hand in their homework on time, not loiter
in the halls, be good sports on the playing field, and abide by
rules that help define a school's character. Some of the rules
that we take most for granted contribute in unnoted ways to
our moral education. We only begin to discern those ways
when we consider alternative school practices. Consider a
common practice in Japanese elementary schools: teachers
ask students who have mastered the day's lesson to help those
students who are still struggling to finish. Students take turns
in serving lunch to their class; and every member (including
the principal) of the school, which has no specialized
janitorial staff, shares in cleaning the building. These prac-
2. Of course, "deschooling society" would only transfer the burdens
of moral education in a democracy to other social institutions. The new
educational institutions that Ivan Illich describes are intended to do much
more than teach cognitive skills and factual knowledge. So, the problem of
moral education remains, although Illich's proposed solution is not demo-
cratic. See I. ILLIcH DESCHOOLING SOCIETY, (1970).
3. For the source and explanation of the term "hidden curriculum,"
see P. JACKSON, LIFE IN CLASSROOMS, (1968). See also Purpel and Ryan, It
Comes With the Territory: The Inevitability of Moral Education in the Schools, in
THE TERRITORY, 44-54 (McCutchan, ed. 1976).
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tices and many others are lessons in egalitarianism that may
never need to be taught in the curriculum if they are consist-
ently practiced in the classroom and by the school authori-
ties.4 Elementary schools in the United States teach different
moral lessons, but they too engage in moral education simply
by not doing what Japanese schools do. The choice facing
schools therefore is not whether to engage in moral educa-
tion, but what sort of moral education to engage in.
Democratic schools should serve our interests as citizens
in the moral education of the future citizens. Our parental
interests are to some extent independent of our role as demo-
cratic citizens, and hence the emphasis of moral education
within the family is likely to be quite different from that
within schools. Most parents want to create a family life that
satisfies our emotional and spiritual needs, and to share our
particular values with our children. However deep this con-
cern for sharing our particular values, it need not imply an
equal concern for spreading these values more generally
among children. We can recognize the advantages of living in
a society in which a variety of values are deeply held and par-
ents are free to teach their values with their children. But
this freedom depends on children being taught widespread
and enduring tolerance for different ways of life.
The value of teaching toleration can therefore also be
derived from our interest as parents in being free to pass on
our own values. But were we to act as parents concerned only
to maximize the moral welfare of our own children, we might
not teach them tolerance of other religious or ways of life.
Unless all other parents teach tolerance as well, our children
will not benefit. And if all other parents teach their children,
then we need not teach ours. Our children will still benefit
and we might thereby avoid the risk of their conversion to
another faith or way of life. The problem of moral education
thus may be viewed as a kind of Prisoner's Dilemma for
which a democratic moral education in public schools is the
solution.5 If everyone's child is taught toleration, we are all
4. CUMMINGS, EDUCATION AND EQUALITY IN JAPAN, 107-132 (1980).
"Egalitarian education" in Japan is a relatively recent product of the Occu-
pation reforms and is discussed by Cummings as. a promising example of
how educational institutions might serve a transformative rather than con-
servative function in a democratic society.
5. Derek Parfit develops the idea of many person Prisoner's Dilem-
mas and uses the "Parent's Dilemma" as an example of the problem that
comes from giving priority to certain rather than all others. Prudence, Mo-
rality, and the Prisoner's Dilemma, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCI-
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better off than if no one's child is. But we might satisfy our
own interests better if we did not teach our own child toler-
ance, regardless of what other parents teach their children. It
is therefore in the collective but not the individual interest of
parents for all schools to teach toleration to all children. But
prudence alone would not lead any parent whose primary
concern is to pass on her own faith to teach toleration of
other faiths as an essential part of her child's moral
education.
Teaching toleration is not without its risks from the per-
spective of parents. As children learn to respect other faiths,
they may also adopt another.' The line between learning to
tolerate other values and accepting them as one's own is clear
in theory, but in practice the former may serve as a bridge to
the latter. This is a risk that democratic citizens must be will-
ing to take. Some parents diminish this risk by sending their
children to parochial schools that teach the truths of their
religion. But parents cannot entirely avoid the risk of assimi-
lation or conversion that accompanies the lesson of toleration
without also foresaking their obligation as citizens to perpetu-
ate a democratic culture.1 Even parochial schools are respon-
sible for teaching their students to respect conflicting points
of view: fairness demands that the risks and benefits of tolera-
tion be universally (but not equally) distributed.8
Because children are not the mere creatures of their par-
ents, the problem of paternalism in education cannot be
avoided "by regarding the family as the basic unit and there-
ErY, 539-564 (November 16, 1978).
6. This is part of a larger problem of sheer exposure to competing
viewpoints that also carries with it the risk of conversion. Some religious
sects, the Amish for example, seek to isolate their children as much as pos-
sible from "worldly knowledge," including children of other faiths, in or-
der to avoid the risk of corruption. See J. HOSTErLR AND G. HUNTINGTON,
CHILDREN IN AMISH SOCIETY: SOCIALIZATION AND COMMUNITY EDUCATION,
(1971), and A. KEIN, COMPULSORY EDUCATION AND THE AMISH: THE RIGHT
NOT TO BE MODERN, (1975).
7. The risk, of course, is considerably smaller for adults than for
children. But children who grow up learning the lesson of intolerance can-
not suddenly be converted into tolerant adults.
8. Not equally distributed because the risks are higher and the bene-
fits lower for some citizens than for others. Assuming any risk at all will
seem unfair to parents who believe that their religion is the only path to
salvation. But the alternative to distributing the burden widely is to exempt
some citizens from any responsibility for supporting a good - democratic
tolerance - from which everyone benefits, and wants to benefit. In some
sense, a democracy compensates for this inequality by permitting parents to
educate their children in parochial schools.
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fore parents as responsible for their children."' Nor can we
reject public education on the grounds that "each human be-
ing [must] develop from within, self-active and free. '"1 Par-
ents as well as democratic communities are bound to bias the
future moral development of children by their own values,
which are to a significant extent also social creations. Moral
education in a democracy is thus best viewed as a shared trust
of the family and the polity, mutually beneficial to all parties
involved if we accept the values of both family life and demo-
cratic citizenship.
Because families are a relatively independent source of
moral education, decisions regarding the means and ends of
moral education within public schools are bound to be con-
troversial. But this is not a reason for abolishing public
schools any more than the fact that parents create this con-
troversy is a reason for abolishing the family. Parents and cit-
izens both have valuable and largely complementary roles to
play in the moral education of children: the former in teach-
ing children what it means to be committed to particular peo-
ple and one way of life among many; the latter in teaching
responsibilities and rights within a more heterogeneous com-
munity and expanding choices of the good life beyond those
valued by their parents.
How can public schools in a democracy best perform
these functions of moral education? By a significant degree of
local democratic control over issues of moral education
within public schools, with limits upon communal control set
by the democratic principle of non-repression." In the pro-
cess of criticizing four popular alternatives to the democratic
position, I defend and develop the democratic view in more
detail.
9. Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, 124 in (Robert A.
Solo ed. 1955), Friedman admits that "such a procedure rests on expedi-
ency rather than principle," but does not recognize the significance of our
democratic responsibility for children.
10. F. FROEBEL, THE EDUCATION OF MAN, 13 (1887). For an intrigu-
ing discussion of the educational movement that grew out of this liberta-
rian philosophy of education, see P. AVRiCH, THE MODERN SCHOOL MOVE-
MENT: ANARCHISM AND EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, (1980).
11. The principle of non-repression prevents a democratic state,
and all groups within it, from restricting the consideration or pursuit of





A popular position on moral education commonly identi-
fied as liberal requires that public schools teach the capacity
for independent moral reasoning and moral choice without
predisposing children towards a particular conception of the
good life or a particular moral character (aside from one de-
fined by this capacity). Just as a liberal state must leave its
adult citizens free to pursue their own way of life, so must its
schools leave children free to choose and develop their own
values. If it did predispose citizens by educating them as chil-
dren, the professed neutrality of the liberal state with regard
to its adult citizens would be a cover for the bias of its educa-
tional system.
The position of liberal neutrality with regard to children
is articulated by proponents of the educational method
known as "values clarification," which enjoys widespread use
in public schools throughout the United States. Proponents
of courses on values clarification identify two major purposes
of moral education within schools. The first is to inform stu-
dents of the diversity of moral perspectives found among
their peers; the second is to help them understand and de-
velop their own set of values. Values clarification is viewed by
its proponents as the only pedagogical alternative to indoctri-
nation by teachers:
In place of indoctrination, my associates and I are substitut-
ing a process approach to the entire area of dealing with val-
ues in the schools, which focuses on the process of valuing,
not on the transmission of the "right" set of values. We call
this approach values clarification, and it is based on the pre-
mise that none of us has the "right" set of values to pass on
to other people's children."1
Proponents of values clarification do not deny that pedagogi-
cal neutrality itself is a value, nor that their defense of values
clarification is based upon certain values:
If we urge critical thinking, then we value rationality. If we
support moral reasoning, then we value justice. If we advo-
cate divergent thinking, then we value creativity. If we up-
hold free choice, then we value autonomy or freedom. If we
12. Simon, Values Clarification vs. Indoctrination, in Purpel and Ryan,
supra note 3 at 126-135.
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encourage "no-lose" conflict resolution, then we value
equality. . . . Called before the committee, we can only say
that values clarification is not and never has been "value-
free.""3
It is a reductio ad absurdum, commonly engaged in, to
criticize the liberal position for being value laden. Propo-
nents of values clarification can admit without fear of self-
contradiction that they are morally committed to a value-
laden pedagogical position: teachers should not impose their
views on students. This position is based upon a belief that
the process of values clarification is the most effective means
to help children develop moral character. If the liberal posi-
tion in moral education is problematic, it is not because it at-
tempts and fails to be value-neutral in this general sense.
Democratic government presumes that citizens have a ca-
pacity for independent moral reasoning. Courses in values
clarification are aimed at teaching children how to think,
communicate and choose their values without relying directly
upon the authority of their parents or teachers for answers.
The method is also likely to teach the virtue of toleration.
Teachers listen carefully and respond sympathetically to a va-
riety of different moral points of view, and require students
to listen and encourage them to respond on the basis of their
own values. Just as the political process of democracy does
not aim at political consensus but at a situation in which mi-
norities can respect the decisions of majorities, so this peda-
gogical process does not aim at value consensus, but at a situ-
ation in which every student can respect the values of every
other while holding his own, possibly conflicting, set of moral
values. This liberal view of both democracy and moral educa-
tion presumes that there is a wide range of moral issues upon
which reasonable people can disagree, and that mutual re-
spect among persons who disagree is a fundamental value.
Extending this analogy reveals what is wrong with the
values clarification approach. Minorities can reasonably be
asked to live with only those decisions of majorities that re-
spect their basic civil and political rights. Political respect
should be reciprocal. Why should teachers then respect - or
ask their students to respect - moral points of view that
deny the justice of these rights or that require intolerance of
other points of view? Not every conception of the good life
13. Kirschenbaum, Clarifying Values Clarification: Some Theoretical Is-
sues, in Purpel and Ryan, supra note 3 at 122.
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accepts the virtue of toleration or accords respect to different
moral points of view. The moral character that liberals seek
to foster cannot therefore be predicated upon even the lim-
ited neutrality to which proponents of values clarification are
committed. The virtue of toleration and respect specifies a
limited range of moral characters within the available uni-
verse: those that admit tolerance and respect for competing
moral views.
Courses on values clarification violate the basic moral
values of some religious fundamentalists and conflict with
their view of the proper way for schools to develop good
moral character. These citizens believe that the only way to
create good citizens is for schools to teach children unques-
tioning respect for a pre-existing and absolute moral author-
ity. On their view, those who simply clarify values mistakenly
accord respect to children as if they were complete moral be-
ings, rather than teaching them that their own worth is de-
pendent upon their unquestioning acceptance of authority.
Whether this moralistic position is correct is beside my point
here: the liberal position on moral education cannot be true
to its own neutrality principle and still achieve its goals of
teaching children respect for the values of rationality, justice,
creativity, freedom and equality.
We know that a just democracy depends on the wide-
spread acceptance of certain values - honesty, toleration, a
predisposition to nonviolence, and a belief in political equal-
ity. Even the most committed democrats will qualify their
principle of toleration to prevent the intolerant from gaining
political power and thereby destroying democracy. An educa-
tion in democratic values, if successful, is bound to bias chil-
dren against certain religious beliefs and ways of life. Because
democratic education must aim at developing a strong bias in
favor of democratic values, there is little reason to think that
democratic schools can rely upon the process of values clarifi-
cation to fulfill their goals in moral education, and there is no
reason to think that they must.
B. Liberal Moralism
What I call "moralist" positions on moral education
share two basic premises: that there exists an ideal or appro-
priate moral character for any given society, and that schools
should do their best to develop that character. The moralist
begins where my critique of liberal neutrality leaves off, with
a conception of moral education whose explicit purpose is to
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inculcate moral character and with an educational program
whose methods do not (nor do they claim to) value the peda-
gogical process as an end in itself.
There are many substantive moralist positions, each rep-
resenting a different theory of moral character and of moral
education suitable for that character. Liberal moralist posi-
tions identify the capacity for choice as an essential part of
good character, and at some stage in education they there-
fore are likely to endorse nondirective teaching methods sim-
ilar to those to which proponents of liberal neutrality are
committed. But liberal moralists self-consciously share two
basic aims with conservative moralists, which set them apart
from advocates of liberal neutrality. They seek through edu-
cational methods to create a particular kind of moral charac-
ter, rather than merely trying to facilitate free and informed
choice. Secondly, they recognize that public schools are the
appropriate institutions of moral education because moral
character is a social, not just an individual or familial, good.
Liberal moralists are committed to the goal of educating
"autonomous" individuals. Identifying the standards of moral
autonomy is a notoriously difficult philosophical problem.
Let's assume that morally autonomous people are willing and
capable of making choices self-consciously, understanding the
reasons for the choices they make, and accepting as moral
only those actions and reasons that are consistently generaliz-
able and acceptable by all other potentially autonomous per-
sons. In short, autonomous people must be capable not just
of choosing and acting upon their own values, but of choos-
ing and acting upon values that are moral. Liberal moralists
clearly do not presuppose that moral education must be lim-
ited to helping children understand and apply whatever val-
ues they happen to bring into the classroom.
Guided by Piaget's extensive work on the subject of
moral development, John Rawls outlines a three-stage theory
of liberal moralist education in Part III of A Theory of Jus-
tice. 1 Children begin to learn morality by following rules be-
cause people whom they recognize as authorities issue them.
Although the "morality of authority" is only an early stage of
moral development, it is essential that the authoritative com-
mands issued to children be guided by just principles. Other-
wise, the foundation of autonomy will not be sound."' The
second stage of moral development, the "morality of associa-
14. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
15. Id. at 462-467.
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tion," is characterized by an acceptance of rules because they
are appropriate to fulfilling the roles that individuals play
within various associations." Children learn that students,
friends and citizens obey moral rules because they thereby
benefit the association of which they are a part, and are bene-
fited in turn. In a just society, the final stage of moral devel-
opment, the "morality of principles," is achieved "quite natu-
rally" through these associational experiences:
We develop a desire to apply and to act upon the principles
of justice once we realize how social arrangements answer-
ing to them have promoted our good and that of those with
whom we are affiliated. In due course we come to appreci-
ate the ideal of just human cooperation.17
Rawls does not consider the role that schools must play
in aiding the natural development of a morality of principle.
I presume that as long as parents continue to exert a major
educational influence on their children within the family,
schools must insure that their influence does not preclude un-
derstanding and respect for alternative ways of life. We need
not assume that the virtue of tolerance comes "naturally"
even in a just society without the intervention of schooling."'
But learning the principles of justice surely does not
come naturally in a less than just society, and that is where
liberal moralists apply developmental theories like Rawls's in
order to determine what schools must do to teach the virtues
of justice to children. In non-ideal democracies, schools face
the more difficult educational task of attempting to overcome
the corrupting influence of unjust authorities and associa-
tions. Yet it is even more essential for them to bear the bur-
den of moral education if they can find a legitimate means of
doing so. If they can develop in children the morality of prin-
ciples, schools can increase the likelihood that citizens will ac-
cept as their duty the advancement of just social institutions,
a goal that is more pressing in an unjust society than in a just
one.
16. Id., at 467-72.
17. Id., at 474.
18. One's judgment here depends on how one defines a just society.
I assume that parents in a just society may still be more concerned with
passing on their own religious values to their children than with teaching
them to understand and respect other ways of life. This seems consistent
with Rawls' idea of a well-ordered society, and has the advantage of not
defining away the major problems of moral education and public schooling
that our society today faces.
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But is any attempt by schools to achieve this goal in the
midst of injustice bound to fail? It seems plausible that even
in our society a school can help develop the morality of asso-
ciation by instituting rules that permit students to participate
in making school policy within limits set by the school's pur-
poses and to develop the cooperative moral sentiments -
trust, impartiality, and fairness - that define the morality of
association. Dewey's ideal of a school that is a "miniature
community, an embryonic society" whose aim is "not the eco-
nomic value of the products, but the development of social
power and insight" aimed at developing such a morality 1
And the internally democratic practices of schools inspired by
Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development - for
example, the "School Within a School" in Brookline, Massa-
chusetts - seem to contribute more to the moral develop-
ment of students than schools whose internal patterns of au-
thority are perceived to be autocratic and unfair.'0
But there is no evidence that these schools succeed in de-
veloping in their students the morality of principle, nor is it
clear that they can reasonably aspire to do so by curricular or
noncurricular means.' 1 One need not be skeptical of the justi-
fication for a particular set of moral principles to recognize
that all such moral justifications still leave open the question
of what pedagogical means are most effective in furthering
acceptance of these particular principles in a way that is com-
patible with moral autonomy.
Although it is theoretically possible that this question has
one correct answer, we have as yet found none. The leading
19. J. DEWEY, THE CHILD AND THE CURRICULUM AND THE SCHOOL AND
SocxzTY, (1956).20. See Kohlberg, The Moral Atmosphere of the School, in THE UN-
STUDIED CURRICULUM, 104-127 (N.V. Overley ed. 1970); and Mosher and
Sullivan, A Curriculum for Moral Education for Adolescents, in Purpel and
Ryan supra note 3 at 235-251.
21. According to the research of Kohlberg and his associates,
schools demonstrate most success in moving students from stages one and
two (roughly, the morality of authority) to stages three and five (roughly,
the morality of association). But fewer than 10% of sixteen year olds reach
stage six and there is no evidence to credit schools with this rare accom-
plishment. See Blatt and Kohlberg, The Effects of Classroom Moral Discussion
Upon Children's Level of Moral Judgment, JOURNAL OF MoRAL EDUCATION,
129 (1975) and Kohlberg and Turiel, Moral Development and Moral Educa-
tion, in PSYCHoLOGY A EDUCATIONAL PRACrIcE, 410-465 (G. Lesser ed.
1971). Cf. John C. Gibbs, Kohlberg's States of Moral Judgment: A Constructive
Critique, 47 HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REviEw, 43-61 (1977) for reasons to




proponent of a pedagogy based on the achievement of moral
autonomy, Lawrence Kohlberg, does not provide empirical
evidence for his pedagogical claims that "the teaching of vir-
tue is the asking of questions and the pointing of the way, not
the giving of answers" and that "moral education is the lead-
ing of men upward, not the putting into the mind of knowl-
edge that was not there before. '2 2 Without that evidence,
Kohlberg's account of the ascent to autonomy through his
method of moral education reads like a Platonic fairy tale.23
If something like Rawls' theory of moral development is
correct, then many of the educational practices that propo-
nents of liberal neutrality regard as indoctrination and some
that Kohlberg criticizes as the "Boy Scout approach to moral
education" may be appropriate to an early stage of moral de-
velopment." Just as children learn filial independence after
they learn to love and respect their parents, so they may
learn political independence after they learn to "love" their
country. The standards of patriotism and loyalty, like those
of love and respect for parents, change as children learn to
think critically about politics and to recognize that their civic
duties extend far beyond voting and obedience to laws. A lib-
eral moralist education begins by winning the battle against
amoralism and egoism, and ends - if it ends at all - by
struggling against uncritical acceptance of the moral habits
and opinions that were the spoils of the first victory.
But there probably is no single set of school programs
and curricula that guarantees the development of moral au-
tonomy. Some programs seem to be effective in helping chil-
dren move from the morality of authority to that of associa-
tion, although so many other influences push children
simultaneously in the same direction that even this claim
must be made tentatively.
We should not be surprised to learn of the limited effec-
tiveness of schools in educating students for moral autonomy.
Since moral autonomy means doing what is right and good
because it is right and good and not because teachers or any
22. For a concise criticism of Kohlberg's philosophical claims, see
Harman, Against Moral Relativism, THE NEw REPUBLIC, 34-37 (February 3,
1982). Kohlberg now seems to recognize that the moral adequacy of the
higher stages must be morally justified. See A Reply to Owen Flanagan and
Some Comments on the Puka-Goodpaster Exchange, 92 ETmics 524-528 (1982).
23. Kohlberg, Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of the Platonic
View, in MORAL EDUCATION, (T. Sizer ed. 1970).
24. Id., p. 59. See also Indoctrination Versus Relativity in Value Educa-
tion, ZYGON, 285-310 (Spring 1972).
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other authorities demand it, some of the most effective les-
sons in moral autonomy may result from the opportunity to
disobey an authority whose commands are not perfectly just
or fair.25 At least, we cannot assume that moral autonomy is
best taught by lessons that are planned to develop autonomy
by those who teach them. Although the moralities of author-
ity and association are "subordinate ideals" which must be
"finally understood and organized into a coherent system by
suitable general principles," we must reject the liberal moral-
ist claim that Kohlberg's or any other particular programs of
moral development are necessary or sufficient for a good
democratic education.'
C. Conservative Moralism
An increasingly popular position on moral education es-
chews any concern for developing moral autonomy. The aim
of moral education is to teach people to behave morally. The
emphasis of conservative moralism on teaching children to
respect authority - whether it be religious or political - is,
I suspect, rooted in a deep pessimism concerning the human
disposition to be moral: left free to choose a set of principles
to guide their actions, people are as likely to choose immoral
as moral ones.
Conservative moralists are correct in claiming that our
collective interest in moral education not only places a re-
sponsibility upon public schools to engage in moral educa-
tion, it also permits citizens to bias the moral values of future
citizens to perpetuate democracy.27 The virtues of moral
character that conservatives generally list as essential to de-
mocracy are largely unproblematic (e.g., honesty, fairness,
willingness to work, disavowal of violence and respect for the
democratic process), but the means by which they propose to
teach these virtues are not."' Because they believe that the
point of moral education is to correct and contract freedom
of choice, to teach children to choose just over unjust actions
and the good life over the many bad ones, it is not the pro-
cess but the results of moral education, as of moral decision-
25. Of course, schools might consider encouraging the development
of moral autonomy by permitting students to protest and even disobey
some general rules without penalty of expulsion.
26. J. RAWLS, supra note 14 at 478.
27. Oldenquist, "Indoctrination" and Societal Suicide, 63 THE PuBLic
INTEREST, 84 (1981).
28. Id. at 84-85.
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making, that count. So conservatives are committed in theory
to judging the methods of moral education used by public
schools by their likely results in creating what they define as a
democratic moral character.
In practice, conservative moralists defend educational
programs that they assume are most likely to create this char-
acter, programs often criticized by liberals as indoctrination
or at least as unduly restrictive of individual freedom: collec-
tive ritual celebrations and practices intended to instill patri-
otism, rules requiring students to dress appropriately and to
behave like "ladies and gentlemen," strict discipline within
the classroom and deference to teachers' opinions. With re-
gard to the curriculum, conservatives wish to avoid the po-
tentially corrupting effects of exposing children to false polit-
ical and religious beliefs, examples of immoral or anti-social
behavior and indecent language. Given their premises, con-
servatives can consistently accept the idea, anathema to most
liberals, that public schools must indoctrinate the truth and
moral behavior in children. They can maintain in their own
defense that the "secular humanist" practices within schools
that liberals support are also a form of indoctrination, which
biases students against conservative values."
Schools, I have already argued, cannot avoid biasing the
choices of future citizens towards (or against) particular
moral values. It follows that programs of moral education
must be chosen on the basis of either a particular substantive
view of what constitutes the best kind of moral education or a
procedural view of what constitutes the best way of reaching
social agreement. The procedural alternative is, of course,
not "value-neutral." Justification of the process itself depends
upon a political theory. We cannot, however, merely assume
the compatibility of "substantive" and "procedural" justifica-
tions or their convergence upon a particular set of (conserva-
tive) moralist practices, as one critic does when he argues
that: "we must not only justify any morality we teach, butfind
it already in the consciousness of the American people.. . . What
this implies is a system of moral education that is conservative
in both form and content."30
Even if we assume that agreement is to be found "al-
ready in the consciousness of the American people," it is still
29. See Kleiman, Parents' Groups Purging Schools of 'Humanist' Books
and Classes, New York Times, May 17, 1981, pp. 1, 52.
30. Oldenquist, 'Indoctrination' and Societal Suicide, 63 THE PUBLC IN-
TErS 84 (1981).
19851
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
not clear what that consciousness is. Or how it is to be found.
Do we discover our agreement by voting on practices of
moral education? If so, democratic majorities must have the
authority to produce (or at least try to produce) a new moral
consciousness if they so desire.
Rather than supporting this potentially quite radical ar-
gument, conservative moralists suggest that there would be
social agreement upon a conservative program of moral edu-
cation were Americans not already corrupted by liberal edu-
cational practices and the culture of secular humanism. Be-
cause Americans are corrupted, we should rely on any
educational authority capable of putting the correct set of
moralist practices in the schools. So understood, conservative
moralism is as paternalistic towards adults as any system of
moral education in schools must necessarily be towards chil-
dren. But on democratic grounds, non-democratic paternal-
ism towards adults is much more problematic than demo-
cratic paternalism toward children. The former undermines
the possibility of a genuinely democratic society while the lat-
ter does not.
Let us grant to the conservative moralists that by ridding
public schools of secular humanism, we can produce a con-
servative consensus among the electorate in the United
States. This consensus still would not suffice to support con-
servative moralism. We need a justification that is indepen-
dent of the goal of achieving a conservative consensus. If we
cannot find that independent justification in the Constitution
or the Bible, both of which are open to reasonable liberal and
conservative interpretations, then perhaps we should look to
the democratic process itself, once it is stripped of artificial
manipulations by unaccountable liberal elites (teachers and
bureaucratic). This is a plausible but uncommon line of con-
servative argument. In committing themselves to a standard
of democratic fairness, conservatives would open some of
their educational policies to criticism on their own grounds:
that the intent or effect of policies (such as book banning,
which I discuss below) is to deprive a future generation of
citizens of their democratic freedom by subjecting them to an
ideologically repressive political education as adolescents.
D. Market Control
Instead of offering principles to decide what kind of
moral education schools should provide, proponents of mar-
ket control offer a principle to decide who should decide what
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kind of moral education children receive in schools: control
properly belongs to individual parents exerting publicly subsi-
dized market pressure upon schools of their choice.
Proponents of market control are not committed to a
conception of what moral education should be. They are
committed to not having such a conception. They therefore
do not propose a set of policies by which schools should build
moral character or teach morality to students. Instead, they
assume that parents are responsible for the moral education
of their children. Parents exercise their responsibility by
choosing a particular school for their children. Just as democ-
racies do not impose one set of religious practices or beliefs
upon adults, so they should not impose one philosophy or
program of moral education upon children. The politically
significant differences that Milton Friedman recognizes be-
tween freedom of choice in religion and in moral education is
that moral education is for minors. The state may therefore
properly mandate moral education in school and subsidize it
to insure its universal distribution.
On the market view, the right of free choice for parents
can best be ensured by a program providing "every set of
parents with a voucher certificate redeemable for a specified
maximum sum per child per year if spent on 'approved' edu-
cational services. . . . The educational services could be ren-
dered by private enterprises operated for profit, or by non-
profit institutions of various kinds.." Efficiency is also served
by this system: "here, as in other fields, competitive private
enterprise is likely to be far more efficient in meeting con-
sumer demands than either nationalized enterprises or enter-
prises run to serve other purposes." At the same time as it
efficiently maximizes parental choice, the voucher system
minimizes governmental control over schools, and hence over
moral education: "The role of the government would be lim-
ited to assuring that the schools met certain minimum stan-
dards such as the inclusion of a minimum content in their
programs, much as it now inspects restaurants to assure that
they maintain minimum sanitary standards." ' 1
Many critics of the market view have doubted whether
vouchers would in practice increase parental choice or con-
trol over their children's schooling. They argue, quite per-
suasively, that many parents will not know what they are
choosing, given the difficulty of judging the "product" before
it is "consumed," and the likelihood that advertising will be
31. M. FImwN CAPrrALiSM AND FEDoM, 89 (1962).
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uninformative or misleading. Control over the education pro-
vided within the family has always been and should continue
to be vast within private schools will remain largely where it
is now - with church authorities, administrators, headmas-
ters, and teachers along with an additional group of educa-
tional entrepreneurs - who may not provide more desirable
alternatives but only more alluring advertising.
The major problem with the voucher proposal, however,
is not that it may fail to achieve its principal purpose, but that
its purpose is unacceptable in principle. If minimizing gov-
ernmental control over schools means enforcing only mini-
mum standards, then there is no reason to believe that
vouchers would satisfy the legitimate interests that citizens
have in developing democratic moral character through
schooling. All proponents of the market view recognize that
there are some externalities or "neighborhood effects" of
schooling. We have an interest in how our neighbors' chil-
dren are schooled because we want to live in a society where
people are literate, obey the law and respect each other's
rights without having to be forced or intimidated into doing
so. So some level of cognitive and moral development
through schooling is a collective interest of all citizens. But
the market view assumes that these neighborhood effects of
schooling can be traced to a few isolated parts of a school's
policies - courses that teach the three-Rs are most often
mentioned, sometimes with a civics course thrown in. These
parts of a school's curriculum are properly subject to state
regulation.
But only on a very narrow understanding of our demo-
cratic interest in moral education can that interest be satisfied
by a universal literacy requirement and a required civics
course. The neighborhood effects of moral education are not
exhausted after my neighbors' children learn reading, writ-
ing, arithmetic, and their constitutional rights and duties as
Americans. Yet the logic of individual parental or "con-
sumer" sovereignty over schools depends upon the assump-
tion that the collective democratic interest in moral educa-
tion is reducible to a few centrally enforceable requirements.
If our collective interest implicates most aspects of our educa-
tional practices, including (perhaps above all) the way chil-
dren are distributed among schools, then the realm of en-
trepreneurial control and consumer choice must be narrowed
to the point of challenging the first principle of market con-
trol. The principled case for maximizing individual parental
choice and private control over schools collapses once we re-
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ject the premise that the interest in and responsibility for ele-
mentary and secondary schooling rests exclusively, or primar-
ily, with parents.
We need not claim that society has a greater interest in
the moral education of children than do parents. But parents
command a domain other than schools in which they can
(and should) mold the moral character of their children and
teach them moral principles. The discretionary domain for
moral education within a democratic society. And the exis-
tence of this domain of parental discretion provides a defense
against those who claim that public schooling is a form of
democratic tyranny over the mind. The risks of democratic
and parental tyranny over moral education are reduced by
providing two substantially separate domains of control over
moral education.
With the possible exception of the mass media, public
schools are the only institutions by which deliberate demo-
cratic control can be exercised over the moral development
of future citizens. The case for decentralizing control over
moral education is strong. Centralized control concentrates
too much power in the hands of bureaucratic authority,
thereby precluding effective democratic control, and under-
estimates the positive moral benefits of diversity among edu-
cational programs afforded by local democratic control. But
the most powerful arguments in favor of diversifying moral
education and limiting the power of any centralized authority
are not based upon the principle of market control but rather
on the value of pluralism insofar as it enriches the lives and
expands the choices of citizens. To reap the benefits of diver-
sity, however, children must be taught to understand ways of
life different from their parents and to respect people with
whom their parents would not (otherwise) choose to associ-
ate. The pluralism of a market in which all children are
taught the gospel according to their parents is superficial. Its
internal variety serves as little more than an ornament for
onlookers, not as a sufficient basis on which to build a flour-
ishing democratic society.
Some proponents of vouchers move further towards rec-
ognizing the extent of our collective democratic interest in
moral education and therefore advocate tougher accrediting,
standards and more governmental regulation of vouchers
schools. John Coons and Stephen Sugarman, for example, ar-
gue that voucher schools should be required by government
to be non-discriminatory in their admissions policies and they
also consider, although they ultimately do not recommend, a
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governmental ban on teaching racism within accredited
voucher schools.82 But even their maximally constrained mar-
ket plan falls far short of what is democratically desirable.
Governmental restrictions on voucher schools are justified in
order to meet requirements - to guarantee individual rights.
to equal consideration, due process and other judicially pro-
tectable interests. But there is no reason to assume that these
constitutional protections will satisfy the legitimate interests
or preferences of a democratic community with regard to
moral education within schools. Having acknowledged that
there are extensive neighborhood effects of moral education
within schools, voucher proponents cannot convincingly de-
fend the principle of consumer sovereignty against that of
democratic control over neighborhood schools.
Coons and Sugarman criticize the principled market de-
fense of vouchers and argue instead that voucher plans will
result in the best education for children because parents are
the best protectors of the educational needs and interests of
children. Giving parents more effective freedom to choose
among schools will bring about the closest possible fit be-
tween the interests that democratic citizens have in the edu-
cation of children, particularly in their moral education. To
accept the idea that democratic societies should try to satisfy
each child's particular educational needs and interest (to
some degree) may commit us to providing much greater vari-
ety within or among public schools than now exists. But it is
not a good reason to forsake the educational interests that
democratic citizens collectively have in children. This argu-
ment against vouchers is quite independent of the more com-
mon criticism, which is in practice if not in theory unfalsifi-
able: that the particular educational interests of children can
be served best not by expanding parental choice among pri-
vate schools, but by offering a greater variety of options
within and among public ones. The interests of not only chil-
dren and their parents but of citizens count on a democratic
view of moral education.
III. THE LIMrrs OF DEMOCRATic CONTROL
To expose more of the theoretical ground upon which a
democratic position is built, let us suppose that we have
found a nondemocratically elected educational authority
32. COONS AND SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAM-
ILY CONTROL 101-30 (1978).
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committed to instituting the best available program of moral
education in our schools according to the most philosoph-
ically acceptable set of moralist principles.33 1 shall call this
authority the Moralist Teachers Union, "MTU" for short.
The MTU reliably determines school policies according to
what is known to be most effective in developing the highest
moral character. The justification for their authority is that a
well-ordered democracy requires citizens of the highest
moral character.
This justification of nondemocratic control over moral
education has two serious problems from a democratic per-
spective. First, in order to create citizens capable of demo-
cratic self-government, the MTU removes one of the most
important political decisions from democratic control: how
future generations of citizens will be educated in public
schools. Second, by using nondemocratic means for achieving
the capacity for self-government, the MTU teaches a lesson
incompatible with the democratic principle upon which its
authority supposedly rests: the lesson that democratic citizens
cannot be relied upon to govern themselves unless they have
first been governed by, and then defer to, educators who are
not democratically accountable. The education of citizens
who support democratic self-government thus stands as
strong counter-evidence to their democratic convictions. And
there is no consistent resolution of the problems raised by
schools controlled by the MTU as long as one accepts the
premise upon which the MTU is founded. Moralists must ei-
ther dispense with the democratic rationale for moral educa-
tion or with the assumption that the most legitimate educa-
tional authority is one that is most likely to implement their
favored program of moral education within schools.
Let us now retain the democratic rationale and dispense
with the claim that the most justified educational authority is
the one most likely to implement a particular moralist pro-
gram. This is not a difficult choice in any case once we drop
the two implausible empirical assumptions adopted only in
order to refine our criticism of moralism: (1) that educators
know which program of moral education best develops moral
character, and (2) that an unaccountable authority can be re-
lied upon to institute such a program. Having dispensed with,
these assumptions, the democratic rationale for moralism
provides a forceful critique of those who would deny the le-
33. We must assume here also that local democratic majorities are
not so committed.
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gitimacy of democratic control over the practices of moral
education within public schools on the grounds that these
programs do not conform to their moralist standards. To
deny any democratic authority over schools is to undermine
the democratic goals towards which moral education ought to
be directed.
Once we realize that the independent philosophical justi-
fications of most educational programs are not sufficiently
strong or determinate to override the actual disagreements
among citizens or to justify excluding other programs from
schools regardless of democratic choice, then conservatives
and liberals alike, so long as they wish to remain democrats,
have no better alternative than to endorse a fair procedure of
choosing among programs of moral education. The proce-
dure itself has educational value, and although it does not
guarantee that the best educational policies in every instance,
no nondemocratic authority can promise in principle or in
practice better results on the whole.
The qualification of fairness in the process of democratic
decisionmaking is important. It sets limits on the policies that
democratic majorities can legitimately enact and thereby
opens up the possibility of granting courts the authority to
override majoritarian decisions in the name of democracy it-
self. But before claiming that a certain educational program
is an illegitimate exercise of democratic authority, courts
must demonstrate that the policy is (in intent or effect) politi-
cally repressive rather than simply incorrect on liberal or
conservative moralist grounds."
A. Banning Books
Most liberals view the conservative policy of banning
books from school libraries and classrooms as not only incor-
rect but also as an illegitimate use of local democratic author-
ity. We are rightly offended by the decision by the Board of
Education of Island Trees Union Free School District to re-
move Soul on Ice, The Fixer, Slaughterhouse Five, Black Boy, and
34. Because the effects of educational policies are often impossible to
discern and, even if possible, discernible too late, "intent" is a necessary
standard for courts to apply. Because we want to rule out educational poli-
cies motivated solely by the intent to repress, it is a desirable (even if not
necessary) standard as well. For a defense and clarification of proper judi-
cial use of the standard of motivation or intent, see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DwsRusr: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, 136-170 (1980).
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other respectable literature from the school library." We
may recognize that the Board's intention is to lay the founda-
tion of human decency and patriotism by banning these
books. Yet we can still criticize their attempt to achieve this
end by shielding students from understanding why some peo-
ple use indecent language, hold radical political views, and
break laws. These understandings constitute an important
part of what it means to be a well-informed democratic
citizen.
But this criticism of book banning cannot simply be
translated into a political position denying local school boards
the authority to ban any books of "redeeming social value."
Our position on democratic control over school libraries and
classrooms is not of a piece with that which properly denies
majorities the right to restrict free speech for adults. The
same critics who deny local school boards authority to ban
books admit that librarians have the authority to select books
according to what they think is most educationally suitable
for students, and many also argue that children may be
barred from buying pornographic books and viewing porno-
graphic movies that adults have a constitutional right to read
and see. Majorities may be unwise to pass more restrictive
speech policies for children and adolescents, but they are act-
ing within the range of legitimate discretion given our educa-
tional aims with regard to children, our incomplete knowl-
edge of how to achieve those aims, and our commitment to
democratic control over education.
The legitimacy, as distinguished from the correctness or
wisdom, of book banning by local school boards ought to be
judged by the principle of non-repression that protects the
foundations of democratic politics. The politics by which
books are banned must not restrict consideration of compet-
ing conceptions of the good life and the good society. The ban
on political repression protects democracy against itself. It
prevents majorities from violating the existing rules of the
democratic process or from damaging the process in the fu-
ture by destroying "institutions and practices that guarantee
the democratic character of the popular will: assembly, de-
bate, elections, and so on."' With regard to education, the
conditions of political nonrepression include access within
35. See Pico v. Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School
District No. 26, 638 F.2d 404 (1980).
36. Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 PoLITrcAL THoRY, 384
(1981).
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schools to the spectrum of reasonable political views repre-
sented by the adult citizenry.3'
School board decisions to ban books are thus properly
overturned on the basis of the principle of nonrepression if
they were made or applied in an "erratic, arbitrary and free-
wheeling manner.""M For example, a school board bans the
books listed above and several others for "the use of profani-
ties and obscenities, for explicit sexual allusions, depictions of
deviant sex, the glorification of sex and drugs, ungrammati-
cal usage, and excerpts offensive to racial, religious or ethnic
groups." But they permit other books that fall into these cat-
egories to remain in school libraries and to be used in the
classroom, thereby leaving librarians and teachers without
guidelines for exercising their residual authority.
Inconsistency in applying their explicit policy against ob-
scene literature may be partial evidence that the intent of the
school board's policy is politically repressive. Additional evi-
dence to support a change of political repression would be
the fact that the selective list of banned books represents only
one end of the spectrum of political ideas in the United
States. Although school boards standardly deny any intention
of being politically repressive, their actions often speak more
reliably than their words. If they are granted the authority to
ban all books that advocate or sympathetically portray a par-
ticular political point of view - whether it be communist or
conservative, Democratic or Republican- then they will
have the power to undermine the educational foundations of
future democratic politics.
Although there are good reasons on democratic grounds
for overturning some school board decisions to ban books,
these reasons do not preclude the possibility of legitimate de-
cisions to ban books so long as fair democratic procedures are
used to arrive at the policies, they are consistently applied,
and they do not have the intent or effect of repressing partic-
ular political ideologies. If a book banning policy against cer-
tain categories of books can meet these criteria, then we can
consistently criticize a school board's decision while recogniz-
ing its democratic "right to be wrong." Kurt Vonnegut,
37. The qualification of "reasonable" rules out any obligation of
democratic schools to consider political views that lie beyond the pale of
moral and intellectual respectability. But it also requires that discretion be
exercised in applying the nonrepression standard such that "reasonable" is
not identified with "correct," but rather with "views worthy of
consideration."
38. Pico v. Island Trees, 638 F.2d 404, 416 (1980).
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whose books are among the most commonly banned by local
boards, has recognized this distinction between rightness and
legitimacy:
After I have said all this, I am sure you are still ready to
respond, in effect, 'Yes, yes - but it still remains our right
and our responsibility to decide what books our children
are going to be made to read in our community.' This is
surely so. But it is also true that if you exercise that right
and fulfill that responsibility in an ignorant, harsh,
unAmerican manner, then people are entitled to call you
bad citizens and fools. Even your own children are entitled
to call you that.8 '
The distinction between rightness and legitimacy is impor-
tant to preserve as long as we wish to defend a sphere of
democratic authority over moral education on other than
strictly instrumentalist grounds.
B. Teaching Creationism
Can a school board legitimately mandate balanced treat-
ment of creationism and evolution within high school biology
classes? Democratic communities have a broad range of au-
thority to determine what children learn in school. But does
that authority extend to determining what theories teachers
must treat as intellectually respectable within their
classrooms?
Democratic authority over teachers certainly extends as
far as setting their qualification for office. No single set of
skills and credentials are dictated by democratic values, al-
though some qualifications - race and religion for example
- are ruled out by the principle of nondiscrimination in the
distribution of office.' 0 Once having hired teachers, school
boards relinquish some control over what happens in class-
rooms by virtue of their contractual agreements. Contracts
may guarantee "academic freedom" if teachers have a suffi-
ciently strong and committed union to negotiate contracts
guaranteeing it. But democratic principles alone do not re-
quire granting primary and secondary school teachers a right
to academic freedom.' 1 This right - to scholarly discretion
39. Books Into Ashes, New York Times, Sunday, February 7, 1982,
(News of the Week in Review).
40. For a democratic defense of nondiscrimination as it applies to of-
fices generally, see M. WALZER, SPnS oF Jus'ici (1983).
41. See Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School
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in teaching - should be constitutionally guaranteed within
colleges and universities that are dedicated to liberal educa-
tion.42 But unlike liberal universities, democratic schools have
as one of their primary functions the transmission of demo-
cratic, and democratically chosen, values and knowledge to
future citizens.
Is it then within the legitimate authority of a democratic
community to insist that biology teachers teach creationism
in addition to, or instead of, evolution within their public
schools? Suppose all citizens in a democracy shared a similar
religious conviction against scientific knowledge, a conviction
which consistently viewed all scientific theories that conflicted
with divine revelation as mistaken. Teaching creationism as
an alternative to evolution might be compatible with their
democratic standards. Or suppose that a democratic majority
in a Southern community passed a law requiring all history
teachers in public schools to give balanced treatment to a
"Southern" interpretation of Reconstruction (one not fa-
vored by professional historians) on the grounds that the fa-
vored theories denigrate the South and reflect a Northern
intellectual bias. Again, this community might be acting
within its legitimate democratic authority, although perhaps
unwisely.
But the policy of balanced treatment for creationism is
more problematic on democratic grounds than either of
these hypothetical policies. Unlike citizens of the sectarian so-
ciety, Americans do not share a similar religious conviction
against accepting the canons of scientific knowledge and in-
quiry. Quite the contrary, our ability to agree upon what con-
stitutes a valuable body of knowledge about the physical
world to be transmitted to future generations depends in sig-
nificant measure upon widespread acceptance of secular and
scientific standards of inquiry, evidence and verification. The
fundamentalist religions that reject evolution as a valid scien-
Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1357 (1976);
and Estreicher, Schoolbooks, School Boards, and the Constitution, 80 COLUM. L.
REV., 1092-1124 (1980).
42. I make an argument for academic freedom in liberal universities
in Is Freedom Academic?: The Relative Autonomy of Universities in a Liberal De-
mocracy, in NOMOS XXV: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, in (J. Chapman and J. Pen-
nock eds. 1983). See also ACADEMIC FREEDOM: THE SCHOLAR'S PLACE IN
MODERN Soa-ET, (H. Baade and R. Everett eds. 1964); Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.:
Oceana Publications, 1964; and ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE. A HAND-




tific theory also reject (as they must) the scientific standards
that clearly make evolution superior as a theory to creation-
ism. 8 In doing so, they leave no common intellectual assump-
tions among democratic citizens about knowledge that is wor-
thy of passing on to future citizens. So, while it is true that
scientific standards are not "neutral" among all religious be-
liefs, they are uniquely suited in our society to promoting the
democratic value of a common education for citizenship. 44
Were those who believe in creationism correct in their
claim that evolution is a religious tenet like their own, only a
false one and falsifiable on their own religious grounds, we
would lack a common intellectual ground upon which to
share in collectively educating our children for citizenship.
We might then open public school doors to the democratic
establishment of religion within the classroom. But once
those doors are open, children whose parents do not share
the established religious view will leave. Or if they remain,
they will be taught that their parents' religious faith (or lack
thereof) is incompatible with the education of democratic cit-
izens. So, although the immediate effects of a policy of bal-
anced time for creationism may be innocuous, the reasoning
that justifies the introduction of a controversial and essen-
tially religious view into public school classrooms has the po-
tential for undermining the sole, secular basis of a common
democratic education.
The Southern community that disputes the professional
historians' favored account of Reconstruction is also likely to
provoke controversy, but the controversy over historical in-
terpretation is not likely to be as divisive as controversies
rooted in religious conviction. Democratic communities are
not in principle bound to teach the "truth," although the
wisest communities will strive to do so, but they must be
bound not to teach doctrines that threaten to undermine the
future prospect of a common democratic education. The con-
stitutional prohibition against the establishment of religion
creates such a negative boundary, which is subsumable under
the more general democratic standard of nonrepression. To
43. For a discussion of those standards and the grounds upon which
they are rejected by proponents of creationism, see Creationism in Schools:
The Decision in McLean versus the Arkansas Board of Education, 215 SciE.CE,
934-943 (1982).
44. Their suitability rests in part on the fact that most religious
groups have found a way of reconciling the particular tenets of their faith
with the more universally acceptable tenets and discoveries of scientific
inquiry.
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the extent it is possible, democratic majorities must be pre-
vented from extending their idea of moral education beyond
the limits compatible with a common democratic morality.
This possibility decreases with the increasing insistence by
fundamentalists that their conception of moral education is
incompatible with scientific standards and that science there-
fore must be taught as religion, and religion as science.4The logic of the fundamentalist position would permit
democratic establishment of their view of creation as the true
"science" or, more accurately, the true religion within public
schools."" Once one accepts the view that a belief in creation-
ism based on religious faith cannot be differentiated from a
belief in evolution based upon scientific method, then one is
committed to allowing majorities to decide the system of be-
liefs that should be taught in schools. In a religiously pluralis-
tic society, this failure to differentiate between a sectarian
and secularly based curriculum is bound to discredit public
school in the eyes of those citizens whose religious views are
offended by the established curriculum and to discourage the
creation and perpetuation of shared intellectual standards
among citizens. Our choice is between the disestablishment
of religion within public schools and the de facto, if not de
jure, disestablishment of democratic schools.' 7
C. Levels of Control
I have argued that democratic citizens in a religiously di-
verse society have a legitimate interest in teaching children a
common, secular social morality; that democracy is, within
certain limits, the proper means for determining that moral-
ity; and public schools the major public institutions for teach-
45. See statements by Henry Morris and Duane Gish, director and
associate director of the Institute for Creation Research that neither evolu-
tion nor creationism is a science. See Lewin, WHEa Is THE SCIENCE IN CRFA-
TION SCIENCE?, 215 SCIENCE, 142-146 (1982).
46. Although their most recent demand is for balanced, not exclu-
sive, treatment of creationism in biology classes, the arguments they use to
establish their democratic right to require balanced treatment would also
permit exclusive treatment were a democratic majority to demand it. For
an argument rebutting the charge by creationists of the moral bias in evo-
lutionary theory, see Stairs, The Case Against Creationism, 2 QQ REPORT
FROM THE CENTER FOR PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC POLICY, UNIVERSIrY OF MA-
RYLAND, 9-11 (1982).
47. For the rationale for the disestablishment of religion upon which




ing it. But which democratic majority should determine school
policy on moral education for a large society like the United
States?
Imagine a small, democratic city-state with no political
subdivisions but substantial differences of opinion among its
citizens on religious and political issues. Something like a
modern New England town turned into an independent city-
state. This city-state has a particular identity: its own lan-
guage, literacy and cultural idols, national holidays and
games, honors and taboos. Part of the social identify of its
citizens, an important part, is based upon this culture. Since it
is a democratic culture, their national identity is shared, not
exclusive to or differentiated among classes, religions, or
races. Yet national identity only partially accounts for the
identity of citizens. They also are members of subcultures, re-
ligious, occupational, familial and friendship groups. In short,
they are people with a plurality of social identifications and
identities. What do democratic standards or moral education
demand in the schools of such a state?
The schools of this city-state are responsible for teaching
the common culture, recognizing the value of subcultures,
and encouraging the cultivation of individual identities. The
common culture consists of ideas and practices particular to
this city-state and ones essential to any democratic society: re-
ligious and political toleration, an obligation to obey demo-
cratically enacted laws, and a respect for the dignity of all
persons. We cannot make a corresponding list of particular
values and practices, but these also are democratically insti-
tuted within schools in order that they remain part of a com-
mon democratic culture.
Democratic control over public schools is the primary
means by which this democratic society preserves or changes
the particular ideas and practices of its culture. But there are
limits upon what a democratic majority or their elected rep-
resentatives on the school board may do. These limits are de-
termined by the democratic purposes of public schools and
enforced by a judicial body that reviews policies alleged to
violate the democratic principle of nonrepression. Demo-
cratic politics both empowers and constrains the authority of
a democratic community over moral education. In a very
small city-state, one school board is responsible for all demo-
cratic decisions concerning moral education. The authority
of the adult community acting democratically is final except
in cases where their policies violate standards that underlie
their own claim to sovereignty.
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Because our imaginary city-state is so small, democratic
control can be effective, and the effects of democratic deci-
sionmaking significant. Members of the school board are held
accountable for their policies by voters. Voters have rela-
tively easy access to information about the school board's pol-
icies and how the schools are run on the basis of those poli-
cies. Policies are likely to make a difference in how schools
are run.
We introduce a new set of problems when we expand the
size of our imaginary democratic society and its school system
beyond what one school board can effectively control and still
be effectively controlled by voters. Now, in addition to asking
how much control a democratic majority should have over
moral education, we must also ask how democratic authority
should be apportioned among national, state, county and lo-
cal levels, assuming that at each level the educational author-
ity is either democratically elected or accountable to a major-
ity of voters through an elected official or legislature.
In our imaginary city-state, the same elected officials who
set the moral standards of public schooling could also deter-
mine the programs implementing those standards, oversee
their implementation and be held accountable electorally for
the success or failure of their conception and programs of
moral education. The lines of control over moral education
must be more complex and electoral accountability more at-
tenuated in a larger society. At one extreme, delegating to
local school boards full control over moral education would
reduce the United States to a collection of democratic city-
states, totally neglecting our collective interest in a common
moral education. At the other extreme, centralizing all con-
trol at the national level would eliminate any effective demo-
cratic control over moral education in local schools, leaving
bureaucrats, administrators and teachers in de facto control.
A national electoral majority would have a very hard time
figuring out how to hold their elected representatives respon-
sible for school policies implemented at the local level. Local
democratic control has the advantages of making control
more effective and permitting the content of moral education
to vary, as it should, with local circumstances and local demo-
cratic preferences. And the more effective control citizens
have over school policies, the more likely they are to support
them. Another, general advantage from the perspective of
democratic theory is that local control facilitates the partici-




But to make local control over moral education consis-
tent with a common moral education, the policies of local
school boards must be subject to some national standards:
standards that are essential to any good democratic society
and ones that serve to unite and distinguish us from other
democratic societies. These are appropriately subject to dem-
ocratic determination on the national level, although the for-
mer are constitutionally constrained while the latter are not.
Once these standards are determined, local school boards are
free to decide how to implement them and what further stan-
dards to set. Say, for example, that by federal law all schools
are required to teach children the English language, Ameri-
can history, their constitutional rights and obligations, and to
observe national holidays. States may add requirements of
their own: that state holidays be celebrated, state history be
taught, that one of several texts be used to teach a particular
subject, and other requirements supported by a legislative
majority. Local school boards are then bound to make school
policies that fulfill both national and state standards as well as
their own. But few of these standards dictate only one partic-
ular educational policy, nor do they together exhaust the
scope of policies relevant to moral education within schools.
So local school boards retain substantial control and freedom
to exercise their discretion over moral education within their
school districts, subject to electoral authorization and ac-
countability. Local implementation of centrally determined
democratic standards makes diversity of moral education pos-
sible without destroying the moral unity of a democratic soci-
ety. To preserve the benefits of local control, school districts
must be kept small enough for effective democratic control to
be possible.
D. Private Schools
I have spoken so far only of moral education in public
schools. What control, if any, may a democratic government
exercise over moral education in private schools? An appar-
ent tension exists between the democratic rationale for per-
mitting private schools to exist and the justification for demo-
cratic control over moral education in public schools. We
want to permit children whose parents are intensely dissatis-
fied with public schools to go elsewhere, but we also want to
teach them a common morality. Yet despite the great distrib-
utive injustices of our present public school system, the great-
est source of parental dissatisfaction with public schools is
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moral education (or the perceived lack of it).48 Having sanc-
tioned a private school sector on the grounds that dissenting
parents should be permitted the option of exiting from pub-
lic schools, we cannot apply the same standards to private
schools without taking away with one legislative hand what
the other granted. But neither can we justify exempting pri-
vate schools from all standards once we recognize our demo-
cratic interest in moral education. To resolve this conflict, we
must find a way of combining private control over moral edu-
cation with some common democratic standards.
There are no doubt several ways of institutionalizing
such an accommodation. I suggest only one to indicate that
the conflict between private and public conceptions of moral
education can be diminished even if it may never be over-
come in a pluralist democracy. Of the two sets of national
standards controlling local public schools, the first set -
those essential to any democratic society - should bind both
public and private schools. The limits of dissent from demo-
cratic moral education are reasonably set by the moral stan-
dards that any diverse democratic society would want to
teach all its citizens: tolerance, respect for the rights of
others, a common language, etc. But these standards, which
might be considered constitutional, would leave private
schools considerably freer than public ones to devise their
own programs or moral education and to respond, if they
wish, to parental demand for religious or other kinds of
moral education unavailable within public schools. In design-
ing programs to implement constitutional standards, private
schools are not bound by the decisions of local school boards.
In addition, private schools need not be constrained by those
non-constitutional standards binding all public schools. On
this accommodation, private schools would be subject to
fewer standards and would be freer to determine how to im-
plement those standards to which they are subject.
What are the likely consequences of accepting this limita-
tion upon democratic control over moral education in
schools? A lot depends upon one's estimation of how many
parents would choose private over public schools for their
children once the educational injustices in our society are
overcome. If private schools remain largely self-supporting
and public schools are better and more equitably financed, it
is reasonable to believe that the exit option will be less attrac-
tive than it now is. We would then expect parents who choose
48. Survey reported in PM DELTA KAPPA, (October 1976).
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private over public schools for their children to be more criti-
cal of moral education in public schools than are parents to-
day who use (or seek) the exit option. Committed democrats
who recognize the practical as well as the moral limits of im-
posing majoritarian standards upon intense minorities should
accept an accommodation of private schooling along these
lines. Any attempt to impose the public school's standards or
moral education upon children when those standards are rad-
ically at odds with what they are taught at home is more
likely to galvanize opposition among parents than it is to con-
vert children away from the intensely held moral views of
their parents.
It is a short step from here to an argument in favor of
exempting children who attend public schools from required
practices, such as saluting the flag, that offend the fundamen-
tal religious or moral beliefs of their parents. If public
schools do not permit such exemptions, they are likely to
drive more parents to enroll their children in private schools,
where they will be even less exposed to the common demo-
cratic standards of moral education.
This defense of accommodating moral dissent in public
schools is not based upon a right of free exercise of religion
or speech for dissenting parents or their children, but rather
upon a consideration of the adverse consequences of nonac-
commodation. One need not assume that young children
have a right to demand that schools respect their moral con-
victions or that parents have a right to control the moral edu-
cation of their children in schools to advance such an argu-
ment in favor of permitting internal dissent from many of the
practices of moral education in public schools.
But as children mature, the paternalistic ground for de-
nying them the same free exercise rights as adults gradually
erodes, and then democratic schools should as a matter of
principle respect their preferences unless they interfere with
the democratic education of others or severely limit their
own future opportunities as democratic citizens. The consci-
entious refusal to salute the flag by adolescent Jehovah's Wit-
nesses ought to be respected by democratic schools whereas a
religious claim by Amish adolescents to quit school after
eighth grade might legitimately be denied. Permitting (within
these limits) conscientious dissent from their practices of
moral education enables public schools to offer a valuable les-
son in the democratic toleration, and also helps them retain
the allegiance of dissenting minorities. The private school
sector provides the exit option for intense dissenters as well
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as an incentive for public schools to become more tolerant of
internal dissent without being (in some cases) morally or le-
gally obligated to do so.
I have argued that parents do not have a moral right to
prevent their children from being taught otherwise intellec-
tually sound theories because they are contrary to the tenets
of their religious faith. I have also suggested that our consti-
tutional provision against the establishment of religion, at
least in its application to public schooling, is essential largely
because, like most democratic societies, we are deeply divided
along religious lines. Were we a society with a common reli-
gion or a common denominator of religious beliefs, demo-
cratic public schools could legitimately teach them. For a
large part of American history, belief in God appeared to be
such a common denominator. This is no longer the case, and
public schools must now respect the beliefs of nontheistic
parents in order to retain their allegiance to public schooling.
Where the public school system in the United States
should now draw the line in distinguishing moral from reli-
gious education is a very difficult issue. But a democratic the-
ory of moral education does suggest that if no line is drawn,
democratic schooling will be destroyed. And if the line is
drawn barring all deliberate programs of moral education
from public schools, an essential democratic interest in public
education will be undermined. The fact that all programs of
moral education are controversial is not sufficient grounds
for excluding them from public schools. Democracies were
designed to deal with controversial moral issues, and many of
the controversial issues of moral education are properly sub-
ject to democratic control. Our collective democratic interest
in the moral education of citizens is simply too great to be
delegated to parents, teachers, administrators, and judges.
[Vol. I
